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TheHousing Expansion of 1953-1954:
A Classic Response to Easy Credit
Between late 1953andthe end of 1954, the seasonally adjusted annual
rate of privately financed housing starts increased from a little over one
million dwelling units to more than imillionunits. Construction expendi-
tures for new privately financed dwelling units rose from an annual rate of
about $10.5billionin early toa rate of more than $15billionin the
spring and summer of 1955,orby nearly 50percent (Table 6). The expan-
sion occurred wholly in the government-assisted sector of the market. Total
starts during the year 1954,forexample, increased by about 133,000units
over i starts under the FHA and V.A. programs increased by nearly
175,000units,while conventionally financed starts declined (Table i).
Toisolate the forces producing this vigorous rise in housing starts and
expenditures within a short span of time, this chapter examines the three
main factors to which the expansion may conceivably be attributed. First,
it investigates whether the upsurge of residential building was associated
with income or demographic changes. Second, it examines the response of
the mortgage and housing markets to the general policy of credit ease ini-
tiated in May 1953.Third,it analyzes specific housing credit policies to
determine to what extent legislative changes or discretionary actions of
government agencies stimulated activity in this sector.
Income and Demographic Changes
Changes in personal income after taxes during this period offer little sup-
port for attributing the upturn in housing production to rising demand.
Between the second quarter of 1953andthe second quarter of 1954,per-
sonal disposable income fluctuated within narrow limits at a level of $253 to
$255billion(seasonally adjusted annual rates); and the subsequent increase
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to the first quarter of. 1955, when housing starts ceased to expand, was about
3 per cent. The stability of consumer income during the recession of 1953-
1954was an impressive performance in view of greatly reduced federal
spending and substantial liquidation of business inventories. But the expan-
sion of housing starts was so marked that it cannot be attributed to stable
consumer income or the moderate gain in disposable income during the first
phase of economic recovery in late 1954;nordo the changes in income dis-
tribution reveal an increase in the number of families in the income brackets
with the greatest demand for new housing.1 The income tax reduction of
1954, however, may have strengthened consumer confidence and the willing-
ness of potential home buyers to undertake the long-term debt commitments
involved in the purchase of a house.
Activation of deferred demand might have been a factor to the extent
that restraints on home building during the Korean War had prevented
gains in personal disposable income from exerting their full impact on the
demand for residential construction. This view, in other words, would relate
the 1954-1955expansionin home building to past rather than current in-
creases in consumer incomes, and to the associated improvement in income
expectations or in asset holdings of consumers. But the control of real-estate
credit through Regulation X had already been substantially relaxed as early
as June 1952andsuspended in September of that year. The accompanying
restraints on government-underwritten residential mortgages had also been
tempered and were fully withdrawn in April 1953.Yet,housing starts showed
little response to these relaxations. They fluctuated within a narrow range
at the annual rate of about i.x million units throughout the winter of 1952-
1953; andwhen the general credit restraint of early ifollowed the selec-
tive housing credit regulations, the rate of housing starts declined to about
one million units in August of that year. Moreover, real per capita disposable
income between i 950and1953 showed only moderate improvement, and the
liquidity position of households was not changed markedly.2
The effect of demographic changes on short-term fluctuations in residen-
tial construction is much less thoroughly explored than their influence on
long swings. Moreover, there are no adequate annual data for observing
increases in the number of households or changes in their composition.
The number of families and unattached individuals with an income of $5,000or
over (before income taxes) increased from 21.3millionini to21.4millionin
1954.Inrelation to all families and unattached individuals, the units in this income
group declined from 42.2percent in 1953to41.8percent in 1954.EconomicReport
of the President, January 1957,TableD-8.
2Cf.Warren L. Smith, "The Impact of Monetary Policy on Residential Construc-
tion, 1948-58," Study of Mortgage Credit, Subcommittee on Housing of the Senate
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.The Housing Expansion of 1953-1954
TABLE 7
Index of Residential Construction Costs, 1946-1957
(1947-1,949 =100)
YearAnnualMonth 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957
Average
1946 77.0Jan. 117.7 120.1 120.4121.5126.4 130.5
1947 93.2Feb. 117.6 120.1 119.5121.5127.5 130.6
1948 104.8March117.6120.3119.6121.9128.0 130.7
1949 102.1 April 118.0 120.4 119.1 122.6 128.9 130.9
1950 107.7May 118.3120.8119.5123.3129.8131.6
1951 116.0June 119.4121.5120.0124.2 130.1 132.2
1952 119.1July 119.8122.4120.7124.6130.3132.8
1953 121.2Aug. 120.2 122.1 120.7 124.9 130.5 132.9
1954 120.3 Sept. 120.4 121.9 120.8 125.2 130.3
1955 123.9 Oct. 120.2 121.4 121.0 125.5 130.2 132.2
1956 129.3Nov. 119.9 121.5 121.0 125.7 130.3 132.2
1957 131.8Dec. 119.8 121.3 121.1 126.0 130.4 132.3
SOURCE:Boeckh Index of Dwelling Unit Construction Cost, U.S. Department of Com-
merce, Construction Review.
Nevertheless, the available evidence indicates that net household formation
was declining rather than growing. The average annual increase in the
number of households in urban and rural nonfarm areas from April i
to April 1955 is estimated at 870,000 compared to more than one million
for 1950-1953, which included the Korean War period. The number of
families with two, three, or more children, however, and especially those
with children over six years of age, increased markedly, and this change
tended to raise the demand for larger dwelling units with more bedrooms.3
As builders responded to the shift in demand, the construction expenditure
per dwelling unit rose and total construction expenditures were increased
correspondingly. The effect of this kind of demand shift on the.total number
of dwelling units built is less clear. In any event, the growth in the demand
for larger homes by families with two or more children has been a gradual
and continuous one and can hardly explain much of the burst of residential
building in a single year such as 1954. There is also no indication of gener-
ally increased utilization of the housing inventory that could have sparked
'For households, see Current Population Reports, Bureau of the Census, Series
P.20, No. 76, July 5, 1957.Fornumberofchildren, cf. ibid., Nos.53 and 67, April
II,1954 and May 2, 1956. The census estimates are basedon sample surveys involv-
ingsubstantial margins of error in year-to-year changes, which are somewhat reduced
by comparing groups of years.
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anupswing of new construction. On the contrary, the over-all vacancy rate
was probably rising slightly.'
In conclusion, it appears that demand forces operating through income
or demographic changes had an altogether influence on the great
upsurge of home building in the 1953-1954period.The movement .of con-
struction costs, the closest equivalent of the more relevant but unavailable
final prices of dwellings, also offers no clue to the expansion. Residential
building costs during and 1954werequite stable after the sharp rise in
1950andmore moderate increases in i951 and1952(Table7). In fact,
between July 1953andApril 1954,theydeclined by 2.8percent. Geographic
variations in the cost reduction were altogether minor. Even when allow-
ance is made for advances in efficiency which may not be reflected in the
cost index, the cost decline was scarcely of sufficient magnitude either to
generate increased effective demand for new homes or to cause deferral of
demand in anticipation of further price recession—two market reactions
that often follow substantial price declines. The relative stability of costs
was probably favorable to an expansion but, on the basis of the record of
previous fluctuations in residential construction, it was neither a necessary
nor a sufficient condition.
The Rush into Mortgage Investment
While the sharp increase in home building in 1953and1954wasappar-
ently not associated with major changes in basic demand for housing, de-
mand responded readily to the growing availability of mortgage funds on
more liberal credit terms. And easier mortgage terms in turn reflected the
decline in other demands for funds and an extraordinary response of the
financial system to the policy of credit ease initiated in May 1953.Itis
instructive to trace the ways in which the easing of credit transmitted itself
to residential mortgage lending and construction.
Although vigorous Federal Reserve actions to ease credit were taken in
rapid succession over a relatively short period of time—with reduction of
bank reserve requirements in July 1953followingthe first open-market pur-
chases in May, and additional open-market purchases in August and Sep-
tember, their first effects on the residential mortgage market were not felt
before the fall. In June a prominent home builder stated in Congressional
testimony that "the basic industry of the country, building construction, is...
about to go into a coma because it has no finances."In late summer, the
The first nation-wide vacancy sample survey by the Bureau of the Census follow-
ing the Housing Census of i950 wastaken in the second quarter of 1955.Itshowed
a vacancy ratio of 2.3percent (units available for rent or sale), as against i.6 per
cent in April '950.(SeeTable i7.)
Housing Act Amendments of 7953,Hearingsbefore the Committee on Banking
and Currency, U.S. Senate, 83rd Congress, First Session, June 15-IS, 1953,p.90.
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mortgagemarket was still reported to be in a "state of disorganization and
paralysis." The National Association of Home Builders had just warned
its members against starting projects without a lender's firm commitment for
mortgage loans, as builders proceeding without it had been forced to obtain
mortgages at excessive discounts from par.6 A survey of mortgage lenders
by Federal Reserve Banks in September showed that mortgage terms were
still about the same as in the first half of the year. Even in October, builders
were reported to be trimming their plans for i aswell as their current
production.7 At about this time, however, major financial institutions began
to increase their commitments 8forresidential mortgage loans, as revealed
in data for life insurance companies (Chart i)andmutual savings banks in
New York (Table 8). In November 1953, yields on FHA loans in the secon-
dary mortgage market showed their first decline, lagging by four months
behind the first drop in the yields on high-grade corporate bonds (Chart 2).
Only in early 1954 did housing starts show any marked response of these
manifestations of greater availability of mortgage funds. The annual rate of
starts increased moderately from 1,007,000 dwelling units in August 1953 to
i,o68,ooo units in November, but fell back to a somewhat lower level around
the turn of the year. This initial upward movement was so weak and irregu-
lar and, considering the quality of the underlying data, so uncertain that it
seems more realistic for analytical purposes to place the first substantial
upturn of housing starts in early For that matter, the initial easing
of the mortgage market was of moderate proportions. Between the fall of
1953 and the spring of 1954, outstanding residential mortgage commitments
of life insurance companies increased by more than 50 per cent but had
completed only one-third of their total upward movement, which continued
to late 1954. The decline in yields on FHA home loans purchased in the
secondary mortgage market did not reach its halfway mark before March
1954. A marked upturn in financing applications to FHA and V.A. for new
construction occurred only in the first few months of that year. In early
1954 also, mortgage recordings began to increase (Table g), and a rising
percentage of veterans' home loans made without down payment or for the
°House and Home, September 1953, p. 38.
House and Home, September 1953,p.45.
For an extensive discussion of the practice and procedures of making mortgage
loan commitments, see Saul B. Kiaman, The Postwar Residential Mortgage Market,
Chapters 6 and(Princeton for National Bureau of Economic Research, in press).
Cf. also James J. O'Leary, "Forward Investment Commitments of Life Insurance
Companies," The Quality and Economic Significance of Anticipations Data, Special
Conference Series io (Princeton for National Bureau of Economic Research, in press).
This interpretation is consistent with the cautious statement in the Economic
Report of the President of January 1954 (p. 63) that "housing construction ... may
be expected to continue at a level close to that of 1953."
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CHART 1
Outstanding and New Commitments of Life Insurance Companies
for Nonfarm Residential Mortgages, 1951-1957
(index numbers)
Monthly data for outstanding commitments, April
Quarterly data for new commitments, fourth quarter of t951
Source: Table 24.
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CHART 2
Average Yields on FHA Home Loans Purchased in the Secondary
Mortgage Market and on High-Grade Corporate Bonds,
Monthly. 1948-1957
longest permissible maturity gave evidence of the first substantial liberaliza-
tion of mortgage terms (Chart 3 and Table 26).
In the spring, as the policy of easy credit was intensified, activity in the
mortgage market increased sharply. Life insurance companies accelerated
their mortgage commitments markedly. Financing applications to FHA and
V.A. rose at such a pace that field offices were ordered to work overtime.
A "flood of money" was reported in trade journals, and there was even talk
of reducing the maximum interest rate on FHA and V.A. loans. The per-
centage of V.A. loans made on the most liberal terms rose rapidly. Mortgage
bankers observed that builders were willing to pay discounts of 2.5 to 3 per
cent to obtain veterans' home loans without down payment, and they were
beginning to warn against "overbuilding." In mid-year, the first large-scale
cases were reported of "no-no" down-payment loans which relieved veterans
of the necessity to put up cash for loan closing costs as well as for any
down payment on the house.1°
'°Cf.House and Home, June 1954, p.37,and July 1954,p. 43.
24.
1948'49 '50 '51 '52 '53 '54'55 '56'57
Source: Yields on FHA loans, Table 25.
Yields on corporate bonds, Moody's (AAA bonds).The Housing Expansion of 1953-1954
TABLE9
Estimated Amount of Nonfarm Mortgage Recordings
of $20,000 or Less, Monthly, 1952-1957
(seasonally adjusted 3-month moving averages)
(million dollars)













SOURCE: Federal Home Loan Bank Board. Seasonal adjustment: Board of Governors,
Federal Reserve System.
In the second half of 1954, the mortgage market reached the zenith of
creditease,althoughthere was a notable change of tone in financial markets
generally. The downward movement of long-term bond yields hadhalted in
mid-year.The decline in yields on FHA loans in the secondary market ter-
minated in the fall. New commitmentsfor residential mortgage loans by life
insurance companies ceased to expand in the last quarter. Toward the close
ofthe year, theiroutstanding commitments were more than two and a half
times aslarge as in August 1953;commitments of New York savings banks
for government-underwritten loans had almost doubled within a year. Some
of these forward commitments were reported to be made for as long a period
as two years, far in excess of the usual 6 to i2months. One of the largest
life insurance companies had commitments outstanding about equal to the
amount of funds anticipated to be available for total mortgage investment
during the entire yearof 1955.11Thehectic commitment activity of 1954
was to tax the ability of major financial institutions to absorb the mortgages
when they were ready for delivery, and it was a prime factor in the later
growth in demand for bank credit by mortgage lenders, which came at a
time of rapidly increasing demand for credit from many other sources.
Final lending also rose substantially although much of the stepped-up
The Postwar Residential Mortgage Market, Chapter 6.
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commitmentactivity ofiwas not reflected in loan acquisitions until
z955 and even 1956. Mortgage recordings in 1954increasedby $3.2billion
over 1953, as against only $z.7 billion in the preceding year. The net flow
of funds into residential mortgages totaled more than $io billion compared
to a little over $8 billion the year before. Paralleling the expansion of hous-
ing starts under the government-sponsored programs, about 40percent of
this increase occurred in the holding of FHA and V.A. mortgages. The rising
volume of lending was accompanied by widespread liberalization of credit
terms. In the veterans' home loan program, over 28 per cent of all loans
closed in 1954 were without down payment as against 8.4 per cent in '953,
and there was a similar rise in the percentage of mortgages with the longest
permissible maturities (Table 26). In fact,all of the increase in the
number of veterans' home loans made in 1954wasaccounted for by no-
clown-payment loans. Even though the general capital market had begun in
mid-year to shift gears, credit terms available to home purchasers continued
to be increasingly liberal, reflecting the lapse of time between mortgage
commitments or originations and the final closing of loans.12
Waiving the question of whether the Federal Reserve policy of credit ease
in 1953-1954wasoverdosed (which is outside the purview of this essay),
what explains the extraordinary response in the mortgage market? The
response was partly rooted in the financial conditions accompanying the mild
recession of 1953-1954andwas partly due to special circumstances. The net
flow of savings into major financial institutions increased sharply (Table
ro). On the other hand, the demand for funds by business slackened as
investment in plant and equipment declined and business inventories were
liquidated. Corporate security issues for new money, which totaled nearly
$8 billion in 1953,wereonly $6.8 billion in 1954.Thefederal government,
after the large issue of long-term bonds in April 1953,refrainedin 1954
from making further net demands on the long-term capital market, and its
total net borrowings were much lower than the year before. Business loans
by commercial banks were also reduced. Consumer credit outstanding, which
had increased by $3.7 billion in 1953,gainedless than $6oo million the next
year. These declines in the demand for funds, in the face of an increased
net flow of savings, large debt repayments, and comercial bank reserves kept
ample alter mid-1953, made investment in mortgages (as well as in state and
municipal obligations) increasingly attractive. The penetration of credit ease
into the mortgage market was also associated with the large proportion of
government securities in total holdings of bank and nonbank financial insti-
12Forthese and other time lags, see Marvin Wilkerson and Dorothy K. Newman,
"FHA and VA Housing Statistics and the Housing Market," Construction Review,
June 1957..Forthe lapse of time between easing of credit and effects on home build-
ing, cf. also Thomas Mayer, "The Inflexibility of Monetary Policy," Review of Eco-
nomics and Statistics, November i958.
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TABLE10


















































































Accumulations in U.S. legal reserve life insurance companies including reserves plus
dividends left to accumulate minus premium notes and policy loans. Source: Institute of
Life Insurance.
Investments in savings and loan associations including share accounts, deposits, and
investment certificates. Does not include shares pledged against mortgage loans or in-
vestments by U.S. Government. Source: Federal Home Loan Bank Board.
CTimedeposits of individuals, partnerships, and corporations. Source: Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation.
dTimedeposits of individuals, partnerships, and corporations. Source: Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation.
tutions, which in 1954couldgenerally be converted without loss into higher-
yield mortgage loans or interim loans to mortgage lenders.'3
Among the special circumstances was the desire of major lending institu-
tions to increase their mortgage holdings in the interest of more balanced
investment portfolios, coupled with apprehension that opportunities for
mortgage investment might be less favorable in future years. In spite of the
expansion of their mortgage holdings throughout the postwar period, some
institutional lenders had not yet reached the level of mortgage investment
13Throughoutthe postwar period, shifts into mortgage investment were facilitated
by the progressive integration of the mortgage and general capital markets through
the more standardized government-underwritten loans which can be acquired in a
nation-wide secondary market.
27The Housing Expansion of 1953-1954
thatthey considered an operational optimum. And as the veterans' home
loan program was at that time scheduled to expire in 1957,eveninstitutions
that had previously been reluctant to participate vigorously in this program
channeled their mortgage investments increasingly into G.I. loans. This shift
in investment preferences was stimulated in part by government actions in
1953andi whichwill be reviewed later: the progressive removal of
doubt about the legality of discounts for government-underwritten mort-
gages, the withdrawal of controls on discounts, and the increase in maximum
interest rates on FHA and V.A. loans.
The rush into mortgage investment emphasized one of the difliculties of
a stabilization policy stated in the Economic Report of the President of
January 1954 (p. 5!): "... themakers of policy cannot predict with scien-
tific closeness the strength of the responses which their actions may gener-
ate." Just as the credit restraints of early 1953 produced an unanticipated
exaggerated reaction in the financial the reversal of this policy
met with an unexpected strong response of institutions in the
residential mortgage market. But this response also raises a question about
the conduct of major financial intermediaries. Reacting as they did to
changing investment opportunities, yield differentials, risk expectations, and
considerations of balance in investment portfolios, financial institutions on
the whole acted in a manner consistent with their role in a competitive
economic system and with their responsibilities toward those who own the
funds entrusted to them. Yet, the massive adjustment in their lending poli-
cies, which was a tribute to the flexibility of the financial system, tended at
the same time to accentuate the housing boom. Moreover, as will be shown
later, the great eagerness to invest in mortgages led to overcommitments in
individual cases. Because of the gigantic amount of funds available for
investment, even relatively small changes in the share of residential mortgage
lending in the total investments of financial institutions can result in very
large changes in the absolute volume of mortgage financing. Thus, overly
zealous investment shifts by financial institutions can intensify both upward
and downward fluctuations in the housing sector and help create imbalances
which have adverse effects on general economic stability. The experience of
1953-1954demonstratedonce more that the resolution of this problem is
as yet highly imperfect.
Governmental Housing Credit Policies
Legislative and administrative actions affecting housing credit specifically
were relatively minor factors in the expansion of home building ini
1954. Therewas no deliberate effort by the executive branch to use the
Cf.Arthur F. Burns, Prosperity Without Inflation, Fordham, 1957,p.56.
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governmentalprograms to stimulate residential construction as a means of
cushioning the business recession.
As was mentioned earlier, the maximum interest rate on government-
underwritten home mortgage loans was raised in May i953—from4 to 4.5
per cent for V.A. loans and from 4.25to4.5 per cent for FHA loans. In
view of the generally increased level of interest rates, the action helped
improve the competitive position of these loans, but it had no substantial
effects on loan volume as long as financial markets remained tight. Despite
the rise in permissible interest rates, discounts on government-underwritten
loans kept on increasing until October, as is evident from the estimated
mortgage yields presented in Chart 2. Similarly, the relaxation of discount
controls in the Housing Amendments of June 1953, followed by complete
withdrawal of controls in August 1954,servedto remove road blocks to the
flow of funds into government-underwritten loans (see Appendix A for a
discussion of discounts and their functions, and of the confused history of
discount controls). But the discount issue was resolved only in late 1953
whenthe supply of mortgage funds increased markedly, interest rates de-
clined, and mortgage discounts began to narrow. Thus, these measures
merely helped create conditions favorable to an expansion of home building
when the general easing of credit allowed them to become effective.
The Housing Amendments of June 30,1953 gavethe President discre-
tionary authority to reduce the down payment and extend the maturity on
FHA loans for homes valued at $12,000 or less, but this authority remained
unused; nor was the similar authority granted in the Housing Act of 1954
ever invoked.
Contrary to widespread impressions, the liberalization of maximum terms
for FHA loans in the Housing Act of 1954alsohad but a minor impact on
the home building boom. The act became effeètive on August 2.Bythat
time, the rate of total private housing starts had already risen by more than
20 per cent from its previous low. More than half of the total increase in
the rate of FHA starts from late 1953toearly 1955occurredbefore August
1954.Moreover,the liberalization, particularly the reduction of down-
payment requirements, was greater for loans on existing homes than for
loans on new homes (Appendix B), and, indeed, insurance applications
for existing houses rose much faster than those for new The number
of new dwelling units under the FHA program increased only moderately,
from 252,000in1953to276,000in1954, and remained at this level in 1955;
andtheir share in total starts declined from 23 or 24percent in 1953and
15Duringthe six months after August 1954,applicationson existing Construction
were for 160,764 dwelling units as against 66,530 units during the corresponding
6-month period of 1953-1954.Thecomparable figures for loans on new construction
are 169,331 and 95,497, respectively.
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1954 to21percent in i Incontrast, the number of new units under the
V.A. home loan program, whose maximum terms remained unchanged,
leaped from 157,000in1953to307,000in1954 and increased again to
393,000inI955;and their share in aggregate starts rose from 15 to 30per
cent (Table i).Thus,the expansion was almost wholly in the G.I. sector
which, with the exception of the pro forma removal of discount controls,
was not affected by the Housing Act of 1954.
The i954 liberalization of FHA terms may have slightly accentuated the
boom in its late phase. By facilitating the sale of existing houses on the part
of home owners who were potential new house purchasers, it may have
indirectly helped stimulate the sale of new houses. But it certainly did not
spark the upswing in housing starts and was no major factor in determining
its course. The same is true for another liberalizing provision of the Housing
Act of 1954,whichallowed federal savings and loan associations to make
home loans up to a maximum of $35,000insteadof $2o,ooo, and for the
Federal Home Loan Bank Board's rule of December i953authorizing the
associations to lengthen the maximum maturity for conventional loans from
20to25years.
Transactions of the Federal National Mortgage Association during the
1953-1954periodhelped spark the initial upturn in housing starts, but they
were a minor factor in sustaining or accelerating the expansion. Activities
of the Association in this period were controlled by the so-called one-for-one
program enacted in June 1953(thoughnot sponsored by the administra-
tion). The program authorized and, in fact, instructed FNMA to make
agreements with purchasers of its mortgage loans to buy an equal amount
of loans within one year and to enter into commitments for this purpose.
Because commitments were difficult to obtain from private lenders until late
1953orearly 1954,theFNMA commitments enabled builders to secure
construction financing that otherwise would not have been available and
to initiate or enlarge their projects at once.16 The actual sales and purchases
by FNMA of loans stimulated by this program, however, had a somewhat
unstabilizing effect on the mortgage market. In the initial phase of the
housing expansion, FNMA was a net seller of mortgages on a small scale,
with an excess of sales over purchases amounting to $162 million from
October 1953tomid-1954 (Table it).Betweenmid-1954 and mid-1955,
the Association purchased $409millionof loans (net). Thus, it gave support
to the mortgage market when, in view of the large flow of private funds into
mortgages, support was unnecessary and, on the contrary, net sales by
FNMA would have been desirable to help sop up some of the funds so
"To obtain FNMA commitments, builders were willing to pay for the costs that
mortgage companies and., other mortgage loan originators incurred by buying loans
from the association and selling it new loans.
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eagerlyoffered for investment in mortgages. The result was that FNMA
transactions tended to increase fluctuations in the mortgage market, and
this effect was only somewhat mitigated by the relatively small amount of
purchases involved. Net purchases continued through 1955buton a greatly
reduced scale. The whole episode suggests caution in mobilizing the Federal
National Mortgage Association for commitment purposes. Because of the time
lapse between commitments and actual disbursement of funds, commitments
are not so readily adjustable to current and prospective conditions in the
mortgage market as the Association's over-the-counter purchases and sales.
Search for Flexible Terms in Federal Housing Programs
In conclusion, the housing boom of 1953-1954owedits origin and vigor
mainly to the general easing of credit and to an unusually strong response
by the financial system to that policy; 17specifichousing credit policies gave
only minor and largely unintended support to the boom. While no deliberate
attempt was made to use the governmental credit programs for stimulation
of residential building, a concerted effort was nevertheless made during this
period to obtain greater administrative discretion in the management of the
programs as an added tool to deal with problems of economic instability.
The Economic Reports of the President for 1953to1956 emphasize the need
for flexible stabilization policies, and the development of additional means to
execute such policies was a matter of major concern during these years.
As for the federal housing programs, the first step was taken in 1953 when
the administration requested presidential authority to liberalize the terms for
certain classes of FHA loans. This stand-by authority was enacted in the
Housing Amendments of i 18but,as previously mentioned, it remained
unused. Still broader discretionary authority was requested in presidential
messages to Congress in early 1954.Presidentialauthority within certain
statutory limits was sought not only for liberalization of maximum terms but
This conclusion furnishes another case in support of the view that short-term
fluctuations in building construction, and especially in residential construction, are
caused mainly by changes in the availability and Costs of funds. Cf. William H. New-
man, The Building Industry and Business Cycles, University of Chicago, 1953, and
Jack M. Guttentag, "Some Studies of the Post-World War II Residential Construction
and Mortgage Markets" (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Columbia University,
1958). However, no systematic association has been found between long-term varia-
tions in the level of residential construction and long-term changes in interest rates.
Cf. Leo David Blank, and Louis Winnick, Capital Formation in Residential
Real Estate, Princeton for National Bureau of Economic Research, 1956, PP. 224-226.
Public Law 94, 83rd Congress, 1st Session, approved June 30,1953.Section 3
allowed the President to reduce the down payment on new single-family homes bought
with an FHA mortgage to 5 per cent and to lengthen the maturity of the mortgage
to 30yearsprovided that the principal amount of the loan did not exceed $12,000.
Inusing this authority, the President was to take into account the general effect of































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.The Housing Expansion of 1953-1954
alsofor their tightening—that is,for requiring higher down payments
and shorter loan maturities—and for setting interest rates. Moreover, these
stand-by powers were requested for V.A. loans as well as for FHA loans.
And it was stated explicitly that the discretionary authority was to be used
in the interest of maintaining economic stability.19
The administration's housing bill of
20filledin the details. It pro-
posed that the President be empowered to establish the interest rate on FHA
and V.A. loans at any level subject to a ceiling of 6 per cent (the existing
statutory ceiling on FHA loans) provided that it was not more than 2.5 per
cent above the going rate on long-term U.S. bonds. It authorized the
President to alter loan maturities subject to a maximum of 30 years (the
existing statutory limit on V.A. loans, but in excess of most of the varying
limits on FHA loans). And it permitted the President to raise the down
payments on homes bought with FHA or V.A. mortgages over and above
the minimum amounts required by law.
This was not the first legislation allowing flexible use of certain federal
housing programs. The Housing Act of hadgiven the President author-
ity to accelerate the public housing and the urban redevelopment programs
if conditions in the building industry and the national economy made such
action advisable. But flexibility was allowed only for acceleration, not for
deceleration, and the programs were relatively small. Moreover, extremely
long lead times make it difficult to use these programs for short-run economic
stabilization policies. The discretionary powers requested in 1954, in contrast,
would have permitted both deceleration and acceleration, and they would
have applied to programs that exertimportant influence on the volume
of residential construction and involve shorter lead times. Consequently,
this was the first time in about 20 years of housing legislation that the
principle of administering major federal credit programs in such a manner
as to help maintain economic stability was clearly enunciated as govern-
mental policy.21
'9See the general statement in the Economic Report of the President, January 1954,
p. 84, and the more specific recommendations in the President's Housing Message of
January 25, 1954.
20H.R. 7839, 83rd Congress, 2nd Session. The applicable provisions are in Title II
of the bill. See also Housing Act of 1954,Hearingsbefore the House Committee on
Banking and Currency, 83rd Congress, 2nd Session, March 1954.
Sucha policy had been recommended earlier by students in this field. Cf. the
following writings of the author: "Housing Policy and the Building Cycle," Review
of Economic Statistics, May i942;"Stabilization of Construction Employment—A
Step toward Over-all Stabilization," in The Winning Plans in The Pabst Postwar
Employment Awards, '944; and "Stabilizing Residential Construction—A Review of
the Postwar Test," American Economic Review, September 1949.Thepresent paper
represents, it is hoped, an improved extension of this earlier work on the basis of new
experience and further reflection.
35The Housing Expansion of 1953-1954
Mostof the discretionary powers requested in 1954werenot granted. The
only vestige remaining in the Housing Act of 1954 was a minor presidential
authority to liberalize slightly the down payment on homes bought with
FHA loans by applying the minimum of 5 per cent to the first $zo,ooo
instead of $9,000ofappraised value. This stand-by authority was not used,
and it was removed in later amendments.
But although most of the discretionary powers were denied to the Execu-
tive, the principle of using the federal housing credit programs in a manner
calculated to aid economic stability had received definite executive sanction.
In the following year, when the principle was realized by exercise of the
regulatory authority vested in the Federal Housing Administration and the
Veterans Administration, one of the major housing issues in economic sta-
bilization policy was clearly drawn.
36